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study followed a qualitative research methodology where data was collected from a comprehensive literature 
review, an international workshop and interviews. The findings established that the UK healthcare emergency 
planning process needs to: consider the integration of soft and hard resources (e.g. processes, staff and 
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innovatively to develop a comprehensive emergency model, predict vulnerabilities and optimise effectiveness 
and efficiency. The major recommendations are to: identify and evaluate risks more accurately; enhance 
opportunities and reduce risks associated with multi-agency approaches; ensure that soft and hard resources are 
well integrated in planning; involve and integrate more with independent parties such as academia for extra 
support; and innovatively use IT systems to develop a comprehensive emergency model, predict vulnerabilities 
and optimise effectiveness and efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Many countries succeeded in reducing the death tolls associated with natural disasters, due to the 
significant improvement in infrastructure, technology and disaster risk reduction techniques and 
understanding (UN, 2011). Despite this important step toward resilience, there are massive challenges 
facing humanity such as those caused by the Hurricane Sandy which hit East coast of the Americas in 
2012, major 2011 floods in Thailand, or by the complex disaster initiated by the mega-earthquake of 
11 March 2011 in Japan. Risks tend to be the combination of four elements: hazard, exposure, location 
and vulnerability. Most of these are changing dramatically due to issues such as climate change, 
population growth and development of mega-cities, and increased infrastructure and properties 
vulnerability, which is driven by lack of finance, building practices and appropriate standards. 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is rarely exposed to major hazards; consequently, the country has been 
following legislations dated back to the Second World War II where the main focus was on ‘civil 
defence’. However, the 2000 fuel crisis, 2000 flooding and 2001 foot and mouth disease demonstrated 
that the legislation was limited and unable to cope with ‘modern risks’ and consequently the central 
government decided to conduct a comprehensive and formal review that led to the development of the 
2004 Civil Contingency Act (CCA). Most of current resilience strategies and plans, such as the 
Emergency Response and Recovery and the National Risk Register, were driven by the new Act. 
However, recent experiences demonstrated that these plans should be comprehensively revised to 
consider issues related to infrastructure, logistics and planning. Previous experiences such as: the 2007 
summer floods demonstrated that there was weak coordination between responding agencies and 
organisations (Pitt, 2008); the 2009 Cumbria floods re-emphasised the critical role of infrastructure 
after the severe damage or collapse of 23 bridges; and the 2009/2010 severe weather conditions  
showed that severe weather could also be complex and has the ability to paralyse the country, and 
cause major disruptions to emergency services due the failure of many roads, power supply and 
telecommunication (Cumbria Intelligence Observatory, 2010). 
 
In response to the CCA 2004, the Department of Health (DH, 2005) developed the NHS Emergency 
Planning Guidance 2005 to guide all National Health Service (NHS) organisations to develop their ability 
to respond to major incidents and manage recovery. The Guidance emphasises that NHS organisations 
must have the ability to sustain high service provision despite any infrastructure disruption, and also the 
ability to collaborate with other agencies in order to ensure their ability in responding to major hazards 
(DH, 2005). However, experience demonstrated that this is an extremely ambitious target given the 
“unforeseen problems” that interrupted supplies, and threatened the safety of patients and staff, such as the 
case of Gloucestershire Hospital NHS FT (DH, 2008). The Guidance provided a high level of assistance 
and certain degree of flexibility for Trusts to plan according to their need and vision. However, it does not 
fully reflect the complexity and interaction between the processes and ‘what works on the ground’ which 
may ‘mislead’ professionals to plan for failure scenarios and modes. This combined with organisation 
structural changes will lead to extra-complex systems with less efficiency and higher risks of vulnerability 
that is often difficult to identify. The UK healthcare system is going through a major restructuration in 
which many organisations are ‘disappearing’ or re-integrating to originate new organisations.  These will 
play roles in the delivery of healthcare in major emergencies. The development of a set of evidence will 
support emergency planners identifying the best way for a more resilient and integrated healthcare 
emergency system. This study aims to examine the challenges and opportunities the UK healthcare 
emergency planners and responders have to cope with major hazards, in order to develop a set of 
recommendations to support the development of a new model that will improve multi-agency emergency 
planning effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
2. Research Methods 
2.1 Data collection 
The study adopted a qualitative research method defined as a systematic and empirical strategy for 
extracting information from people (Fellows and Liu, 2003), and is “concerned with developing 
explanations of social phenomena” (Hancock, 2002) to obtain “a holistic view of the phenomena under 
investigation” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Patton, 1980 cited in Matveev 2002) and “a more realistic feel of 
the world that cannot be experienced in the numerical data and statistical analysis used in quantitative 
research” (Matveev, 2002). An intensive literature review was conducted including research papers, 
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official documents and reports to identify national and international disaster management and emergency 
response policy and practice and theory applied in the resilience and performance of emergency response. 
Information was complemented by the outcomes of a workshop where 44 participants attended and made a 
significant contribution through discussions and debates. Participants were from multidisciplinary 
backgrounds, in order to reflect the complexity and dependency of the healthcare emergency activities, 
including: academia, public and healthcare authorities (decision making), emergency services, healthcare 
providers, professionals and voluntary sectors. Nine PowerPoint presentations were delivered covering 
three themes: Acute hospitals and ambulance business continuity perspectives; Lessons from international 
practice; and Improvement of resilience through collaboration. Participants were divided into groups to 
discuss: short and long-terms priorities for emergency services; risks and opportunities associated with 
improving the resilience through collaboration; and potential impact of budget constraints on emergencies. 
The data was supplemented by in-depth interviews with eight experts in social science, healthcare 
management, utility supply, and emergency planning and coordination to provide more information about 
specific issues that have been identified during the literature review and workshop. 
 
2.2 Data analysis 
The literature review data was analysed according to the Integrated Definition for Function (IDEF0) 
modelling technique (www.idef.com). This technique requires data to be classified into four categories: 
input (elements required to conduct the work, e.g. patient/injury); output (elements after going through the 
process, e.g. treated patient); mechanism (elements required for the process to operate, e.g. resources: 
skilled staff, emergency vehicles); and control (elements used to ensure that the process is operational, e.g. 
framework, law). The output is a graphical model elucidating the functionality and contribution of each 
agency to the treatment of injuries/patients and thus provides an illustration of the UK emergency approach. 
Literature data was also used to enhance the clarity of issues that the participants highlighted during the 
research activities (i.e. workshop and interviews). 
 
The workshop and interview data was audio recorded, transcribed and analysed according to the thematic 
approach, where the participants and interviewees’ key statements have been organised according to the 
themes they cover. Seven themes have been identified (see Table 1) demonstrating the major aspects 
affecting the effectiveness of healthcare emergency response and providing answers to the three major 
driving questions:   
• What are the strengths and weaknesses associated with improving resilience through 
collaboration? 
• What is the potential impact of budget constraints on emergencies, and how resources could be 
better exploited to overcome this? 
• What are the short and long term priorities for emergency services? 
 
Table 1- Deducted themes 
Theme Stakeholders key phrases/words 
Risk identification 
Environmental disaster; natural events happen fairly often, natural events are predictable; natural hazard; volcanic 
ash; sea level; climate change; changing weather pattern; exceptional things; inclement, incredible, severe weather; 
weather very rarely kills people; ignore the weather is part of UK culture; careless and stoic towards environmental 
risks; people amazed and shocked by snow; everything shuts down for snow; severe winters is not a disaster; floods 
are recent thing in the UK; wide scale flooding; unusual flooding; intense rain; risk to flood; manmade events are 
sudden and catastrophic; history of terrorism in past; London bombing; emotional reaction to a bomb; scenario 
based route; build a history of failures; flu pandemic. 
 
Collection and 
recording 
information 
No information about the performance of healthcare in adversities; absolute measures; national patient data is not 
useful because it is not record in a timely manner; impossible to extract data from SystemOne; difficulties in 
discharging from hospitals; a lot of time in getting the information to make sensible decision; much information to 
be transferred but only a little of relevant; difficulties to transfer knowledge and skills; severe weather plan; security 
sensitivity of information; data protection; clearer guidance. 
 
Multi-agency 
Collaboration 
Communication; difficulties in communication due to agency structure and administration; hierarchical 
organisation; aptitude to communicate internally more than externally; no pattern of strategic communication; 
bottom-up initiatives; top-down initiatives; effective collaboration; need to share information; less information 
shared on events happening rarely; difficulties in getting utilities companies share their plans and information; 
difficulties in engaging utilities company in planning meetings; utilities companies good understanding of 
vulnerabilities protection measures; engage ambulance service in the planning process; different views, interest and 
agendas; language and cultural barriers; local priorities, strategies and processes; lack of awareness and 
communication; performance of emergency responders; ineffective emergency response; conflicts between the 
agencies. 
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Impact of Budget 
constraints on 
emergency 
planning 
Lack of fair services for different regions; less appetite to expend; lack of multi-agency practice; less detailed 
planning and exercise on events happening rarely; ability to handle disruption effectively; partnership and 
prioritisation; share resources; information technology (IT) techniques; involvement of local community; local 
resilience forum; resilience of healthcare; no attention to resilience. 
 
Infrastructure 
performance to 
natural hazards 
and extreme 
weather 
Drains could not cope; site access; sewers; combined sewers; road salt; design criteria; local draining systems; 
upgrading infrastructure; road infrastructure; vulnerable infrastructure; adequacy of infrastructure; critical 
infrastructure; piece of pipe; failure of a dam; gas; water contamination; shortage of electricity; waste water; we 
rely on telecommunications and IT utilities; maintaining the flood defences; cost to protect the coast; road gritting, 
short terms investments; reduction of resources for committees meetings. 
 
Professional and 
official 
committees 
 
Loss of knowledge; lack of planning process for catastrophic event committees; prioritisation (strategic high level); 
burden of plan on local authorities; resources shortage; multi-agency exercises; training exercise around flooding; 
internal and external exercise with LRF; watch-out meeting; no attendance of Category 1 to LRF; regional massive 
evacuation plan; exercise to flooding and coastline inundation; issues of companies rigidness. 
 
Independent and 
academic 
investigations 
Academic contribution is in finding measures, study impact, look at particular risk;  no much academic response;  
suspicious of universities; no need for more academic; academic add no more value; report and recommendations 
not run by academic; cost of academics; healthcare professional not qualified to collect data and conduct qualitative 
research;  no capability to benchmark practices; no time to read research; responsibilities; trusted figures;  
consultants; professionalism; rational statistic information got twisted by media; exercises between academia and 
the NHS chronically under-funded. 
 
3. UK emergency approach 
The UK National Security Strategy has two high level objectives: (1) to ensure a secure and resilient UK by 
protecting people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from all major risks that can affect the 
country directly; and (2) to shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the 
UK or British interests overseas, and applying instruments of power and influence to shape the global 
environment. Consequently, authorities developed an integrated and flexible framework to be adapted to 
particular needs. The framework is led by inter-ministerial committees and linked directly with the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat, which in turns is linked nationally and internationally. Nationally, it is linked 
with government departments, voluntary sector, and civil protection working party and business continuity 
fora, which in turn are linked to other teams and fora (e.g. Local Resilience Fora (LRFs), and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) resilience teams). Within this framework, an 
emergency can be managed at an operational (known as Bronze Commander), a tactical (known as Silver 
Commander) or a strategic (known as Gold Commander) level. However, in case of significant or 
catastrophic event, coordination and/or directions will be given directly by the central direction of the 
Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR). In order to ensure that this strategy is well understood, many 
documents were produced explaining the role of each agency (e.g. Emergency Response and Recovery). 
 
The DH, in accordance with the government generic emergency plan and the CCA 2004 legislation, 
developed the NHS Emergency Planning Guidance 2005. This provides generic principals to guide NHS 
organisations through the planning and development of their own emergency plans. However, this was 
found to be too generic and ‘difficult’ for many organisations to use in developing a clear and effective 
emergency plan. Consequently, more work was done to provide a clearer documents and procedures to 
support emergency officers developing their emergency plans. The output was a series of documents and 
models such as the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) model. The IEM is a comprehensive model 
based on six actions: assessment, prevention, anticipation, preparedness, recovery and response (PAS 2015, 
2010). Within this model, an emergency officer is expected to follow the guidelines provided in formal 
resilience documents (Publicly Available Specification 2015 (PAS 2015, 2010), British Standards (BS 
25999, 2006, BS 25999, 2007), and the CCA 2004) to develop an effective emergency plan. These 
documents made planning much easier; however, the complexity associated with the healthcare remains a 
major challenge for many healthcare emergency officers who have to plan effectively for such a critical 
service. This challenge combined with the number of agencies involved within an emergency and upon 
which some of the continuity of healthcare depends will add another layer of complexity. The model shown 
in Figure 1 has been developed, based on the Emergency Response and Recovery (Cabinet Office, 2005) 
document to illustrate the involvement of the different emergency and non-emergency agencies in the 
healthcare delivery process through a typical route that a patient/injury would take in case of a major 
disaster. 
 
Within this model, a healthcare facility is represented with a box subjected to arrows from the four 
directions. Horizontal arrows represent the route untreated and treated patients take, whilst vertical arrows 
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represent the support or control a healthcare facility is subjected to. The model shows a comprehensive and 
advanced planning process that has been adopted and potentially could lead to effective emergency 
response. The number and type of agencies depends on the hazard, consequently, the model changes 
shapes and connections to reflect the role each agency will be playing. The police, often  the lead of LRF, 
will usually co-ordinate the activities of those responding at and around the incident (Cabinet Office, 2005). 
For this reason is connected to all major agencies (e.g. PCT, Army, Highway Agency and Ambulance 
services) through a ‘resources connection’, representing the flow of information for the decision making 
process. Emergency healthcare in the UK is thus highly dependent on the performance of multi-agencies, 
which are subjected to various risks that could reduce their performance and could lead to a less effective 
emergency response. It is critical therefore to explore the opportunities and risks associated with this 
planning in more detail to develop an understanding on its robustness specifically in times of decreasing 
budgets and increasing risks, and restructuration of the involved agencies. As part of the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012 (Parliament, 2012) and starting from 1 April 2013, new arrangements are made which will 
result in the abolition of agencies, such as the Primary Healthcare Trusts (PCTs), Strategic Health 
Authority (SHA) and Health Protection Agency (HPA), and establishment of new organisations such as the 
NHS Commissioning Board (NHSBC) and Public Health England (PHE). This change will reflect on the 
resilience of healthcare to major hazards and thus there is a need to understand how these contribute to the 
healthcare provision so that the support is maintained even with this restructuration. 
 
 
 
Figure 1- Previous UK multi-agency emergency response model based on Cabinet Office (2005) 
 
4. Challenges associated with emergency planning 
4.1 Risk identification, evaluation and perception 
Public reports such as in Cumbria Intelligence Observatory (2010), DH (2008), and BBC (2008) have 
described the occurrence of extreme events in the UK as ‘unprecedented’, ‘exceptional’, ‘unexpected’ and 
‘unusual’ due to the severe impact on the infrastructure and society. An interviewee stated that the 2007 
flooding “was unusual flooding. Normally flooding is river rising, over-toping river bank, but in summer 
2007 we had intense rain, which caused local flooding because drains could not cope”. This could be ‘a 
way for defence’, argued another interviewee adding: “natural hazards are by their very nature 
unpredictable, flood water and the direction it can go and speed is what is going to take out which is very 
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unpredictable element as well, so there is always a good defence to say it was a severe weather”. The 
review of statistics, published by the Emergency Database (EM-DAT, www.emdat.be), demonstrates that 
natural hazards have been striking the UK for long time, causing serious disruption to society and economy 
(see Table 2). However, these do not seem to be well captured in the resilience strategies which require 
further investigations of techniques that can be used in identifying and evaluating risks. 
 
Emergency planning is the path to improve resilience and mitigate the impact of risks, which are, typically, 
identified according to: (1) consultation with local community and experts; and (2) advanced and 
computerised techniques for monitoring and projection. The consultation approach is easy to understand 
and does not require as much information and expertise as the advanced technique, for that it is adopted in 
many countries, such as in the UK. The central government suggests approximately 100 potential risks, 
every year, to the different regions of the country, where Local Resilience Fora (LRFs) are required to 
evaluate and develop relevant Community Risk Registers and publish on the LRF websites. Risks are 
analysed and prioritised according to their likelihood and their impact, often using risk matrices. Despite 
the fact risk matrices are simple and easy to use, their accuracy is limited which leads to ambiguity and 
inefficiency in resource allocation and thus need to be used with carefulness (Cox, 2008). 
 
Table 2- Natural hazards in the UK (1900-2012) 
 Hazard Number of events Fatalities Total affected Loss (£billion) 
Seismic activity 2 - 4,501 0.040 
Epidemic 4 71 194 - 
Extreme temperature 7 319 47 - 
Floods 25 83 382,768 10.769 
Mass movement wet 1 140 - - 
Storm 35 4,338 289,196 9.037 
Source: EM-DAT (Version 12.07) (GB£1 is estimated to US$1.5) 
 
Risk identification is the intent to answer the question ‘What can go wrong?’ This answer is formulated 
based on information distilled from past experience, lessons learned from similar events occurred 
elsewhere and brainstorming (Department of Defence, 2006). It is very much driven by past experience and 
risk perception of industry and hospital leaders (Barbera et al., 2009), which in turn is predominated by 
voluntariness, level of fear and familiarity (Slovic, 1987, Slovic and Weber, 2002, Slovic, 2010, Sjoberg, 
2000). There is a strong belief among some of the interviewees that “the UK is used to disaster planning 
because of its history of ‘terrorism’ in the past, which may make it very disaster planning friendly…Based 
on the disaster planning we have had in the UK, we would cope with 9/11 in totally different way than the 
Americans did, much better way” [interviewee]. Effective planning for threats does not necessarily lead to 
effective planning for natural hazards or technological emergencies and this ‘over-confidence’ could lead to 
major failure. For example, after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake (USA), Japanese engineers thought that 
they had better understanding of earthquake risk, which had  led to developing better preparedness 
supported by better building codes, construction material, structures and labour (Katayama, 2008). 
However, the 1995 Kobe Earthquake demonstrated that this perception was erroneous, as it claimed over 
6,000 lives and damages that are still perceived as a major disaster after two decades. People are often 
unaware of all risks, as such they plan only for immediate future and rely on emergency relief (Mileti, 
1999), underestimating that emergency relief depends on the level of preparedness. The findings also 
established that for risks associated to environment, UK people are “careless” and “more stoic” as there 
always had been “inclement weather”, which could have been reflected on the physical resilience of 
infrastructure, as seen previously. 
 
4.2 Collection and recording of information and monitoring  
A significant amount of emergency planning is based on collecting and sharing information from the 
various stakeholders, who gather information based on specific criteria that reflect their need and the way 
they use it. This approach provides organisations with vast amount of freedom to choose the best way to 
collect information and take relevant actions independently; however, it may lead to ‘overlooking’ issues 
that could be crucial for resilience. An interviewee stated that they have developed a log where they record 
damage to their network and when the trend of damage increases, an in-depth investigation is conducted to 
see whether there is a need to renew the existing network components or otherwise. Other agencies collect 
information based on “absolute measures…if the percentage of people runs out of the 4 hour waiting 
8       Achour et al.  
measure, the fact you have bad winter, floods took the road out etc. do not count, you are still measured on 
the absolute measure”. Another interviewee supporting this by stating that these ‘absolute measures’ could 
be changed depending on views, including political views. Furthermore, the way information is recorded 
varies substantially between individuals as records, in some systems, are entered as free text. This often 
results in different spelling which makes the extraction of information difficult when needed. Information 
needs to be collected and recorded according to a particular process that reflects the need of the 
organisation and relevant emergency partners. This will lead to easy use of data to formulate clearer view, 
and consequently supports the identification of the optimum way for emergency planning. It will enhance 
the exchanging information between agencies, which also has been a ‘major challenge’. Sharing 
information has been formally recognised by the CCA 2004, which urges Responders Category 1 and 
Category 2 to share information. The Pitt Review (2008) emphasised that relevant organisations, such as 
the Environment Agency (EA), need to provide more technical information about natural hazards to 
support the planning process. Sharing information has often been considered as ‘sensitive’ for particular 
topics and sites which led to the difficulties to manage risks such as in the 2007 summer floods when the 
“Gloucester Gold Command did not know and so did not protect” the water supply side. An interviewee 
articulated that there is a need for clearer guidance about this as there are issues that they could not share 
with other agencies as these were perceived as “sensitive information” by security services. 
 
4.3 Multiple-agency collaboration 
Responses to major emergencies require collaboration between emergency services such as ambulance 
services, police and non-governmental organisations to ensure that the injured are safely transferred to 
hospitals for medical care. The findings demonstrate that there are many opportunities and risks associated 
with multiple agency collaboration summarised in Table 3. Communication was highlighted as an essential 
issue for effective collaboration between the different organisations which often have different views, 
interest, agendas and the way organisations are structured. For example, healthcare organisations are 
structured to communicate internally more than externally; whilst, emergency services such as police and 
fire department are structured to communicate externally and internally. Such collaboration could be 
hampered by language and cultural barriers. These barriers are caused by local priorities, strategies and 
processes, and, when combined with lack of awareness and communication, they will have the ability to 
affect the performance of emergency responders, and result into ineffective emergency response activities, 
and even conflicts between agencies. Conflicts can arise because of several issues such as “who pays for 
what” and “who leads which activities” which can introduce another layer of complexity on the 
coordination process. The workshop participants suggested that there is a need to: enhance the 
communication between the responding organisations through better integration; share information about 
previous experiences and relevant lessons learnt; and better understand policies, strategies and practices to 
identify the potential connections and difficulties to be addressed prior to emergencies. However, sharing 
ideas and experiences does not necessarily lead to consolidation, but could lead to competition or poor 
lessons learning. For that, “more collaboration and unification (or strategic partnerships) between military, 
police and fire in particular” is needed [interviewee]. Military has excellent physical and human resources 
that could increase the performance of major emergency responses, however, its involvement could be very 
expensive and often needs political decision, for that some political parties “produced a policy paper 
recommending exactly that there is a national structure that involves the military permanently” 
[interviewee]. In all cases, this will not lead to an ‘ideal’ situation as there is “no single solution that will fit 
all” [participant] and that each emergency has its own characteristics and thus organisation policies need to 
provide a degree of flexibility where staff could take a decision when is needed (during the event). 
 
Table 3-Opportunities and risks associated with improving the resilience through collaboration 
Opportunities Risks 
• Enhanced communication 
• Improved performance 
• Pooling resources 
• Increased efficiency and effectiveness 
• Improved integration 
• Higher risk for conflicts 
• Predomination of powerful organisations/individuals 
• Higher risk for competency 
• Difficulty of management/coordination 
• Inappropriate strategies and policies of organisations 
 
5. Challenges associated with budget constraints 
5.1 Potential impact of budget constraints on emergency planning 
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The UK Government has been reducing budget of many public organisations, including emergency 
organisations, due to the pressure from current financial climate. Planning and financing for something that 
is hoped to never take place is an area that many people wish not to spend on because potentially it may not 
be needed! “It’s like a home or car insurance, if I need to trim some money of my household expenditure 
for the year perhaps I can save £400 or £500 by gambling and assessing the risk yourself: ‘It is not going 
to happen to me!’”, stated an interviewee. Findings demonstrate that the budget constraint will affect the 
performance of emergency organisations through many ways (see Table 4) such as “lack of fair services 
for different regions” and “less appetite to expend the expense and time in preparing effectively for 
exercises”, which will reduce the ability to handle disruption effectively and increase the risk of inadequate 
planning. It will also decrease creativity and could lead to blinkered approaches and short-termism that can 
miss the opportunity for future investment, which in turn will lead to a greater public dissatisfaction. 
Partnership and prioritisation could be useful approaches to pool and share resources and ensure the 
continuity of supply chain and prioritise the needs more efficiently especially if information technology (IT) 
systems are implemented. Also the involvement of local community in the process to identify better 
vulnerabilities based on the same principle as ‘neighbourhood watch’ organisations could be managed by 
LRFs. Findings demonstrate that there is a lack of clarity on the best way to address all these challenges, 
and ensure that the resilience of healthcare is not affected by the major change the healthcare sector is 
going through. This was confirmed by one of the participants who stated that “decision makers are aware 
of the issues related to the resilience of healthcare and the impact change could have; however, in terms of 
practicality we are not there yet!” 
 
Table 4- Potential impact and resources associated with reducing the budget of emergency services 
Potential impact Resources 
• Increased work load, and less resources 
• Limitation of service and service quality (i.e. impact on public) 
• Less effectiveness and less opportunity to improve 
• Inadequate planning 
• Potential threat and life 
• Partnership: improve current strategies and practice 
to improve integration 
• Improve planning to enhance efficiency in the use 
of resources 
• Use of IT 
 
5.2 Potential impact of budget constraints on infrastructure 
In the UK, for many years, infrastructure investment was not seen as priority, for example the country was 
the least infrastructure-spending country amongst the OECD countries between 2002 and 2007, leaving it 
with an estimated deficit of approximately £500 billion (ARUP, 2011). Interestingly, spending plan was 
dedicated to improving security rather than upgrading infrastructure network to cope with hazards. For 
example, between 2001 and 2011, £8.4 billion were allocated to reduce risks deriving from political 
violence (often referred to as ‘terrorism’) and floods; however, the majority of this budget was allocated to 
security, although statistics suggest that these had ‘limited impact’ on society in comparison to floods (see 
Table 5). Most of the UK sewage system was designed and built over 100 years ago and expected to deal 
only with sewage. Findings established that there is a strong debate between the private and public sectors 
to upgrade the state of infrastructure. An interviewee, from the private sector, stated: “Under regulation, it 
only applies to maintain our sewers to cover 1/30 year event so any escape above 1/30 year event we can 
say: we are obligated only to 1/30 event”, alerting that any costs associated with upgrading the 
infrastructure to the standard it will be affecting the water bill. Conversely, the Pitt Review Learning 
Lessons from the 2007 Floods (Pitt, 2008) recommends that local authorities need to be in charge of local 
drainage systems, in order to invest in them to increase their capacity and to provide  regular maintenance . 
The Government is considering these recommendations seriously and has to report every six months “to 
show progress made and what more has to be done” [interviewee]. The infrastructure design criteria 
changed from 1/100 to 1/200 years floods scenarios which should provide more resilient infrastructure. 
However, if sewage system capacity is limited to 1/30 years flood scenarios, there is a high risk that cities 
will be covered with water, as it happened previously in Gloucestershire during the 2007 floods (ICE, 2010) 
and resulted in individuals and professionals, including hospital staff, refusing to attend work places due to 
flooded infrastructure (DH, 2008). Infrastructure failure therefore can be highly disruptive with low ability 
to predict its consequences (ICE, 2010). Reports such as those published by the BBC (2009) and Lean 
(2007) reported that a major proportion of the UK infrastructure is vulnerable to extreme weather 
disruptions and floods: 2,215 power stations and substations; 737 sewage and water-treatment sites; 680 
health centres and doctors' surgeries; 99 police stations; 86 fire stations; 82 telephone exchanges; 46 
ambulance stations; and 13 hospitals are at severe risk of flooding. 
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The findings also establish that the dilemma of investment affects even the response to extreme weather 
events, for example, the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) argues that councils refuse 
to invest in snow removal equipment, as they do not consider it   part of their duties to protect households 
and industry. This suggests that the way taxes are used need to be revised. Interviewees reported that the 
2010 snow storms greatly affected their operations: “we had some site access issues; getting hold of road 
salt to make the site accessible was a nightmare for us as well as everybody else”. Failing to provide 
sufficient supply to cope with the high demand enabled some suppliers to take advantage of the situation, 
and to make larger profit: “some of the supplies started getting ‘profit-making’ a little bit which we just 
refused to pay some of the prices which were the top of the scale!” [interviewee]. 
 
In summary, to ensure the effectiveness of an emergency response, the UK infrastructure resilience needs 
to be upgraded. Ways to be more efficient with expenditure are always welcomed as long as they convince 
individuals that they will not compromise resilience: an interviewee stated that the situation “is so complex 
and so involved that we always are going to end up having what we always had”, specifically in the current 
economic climate and the belief that people “are in more control of extreme weather events…and know 
how to put up with them”. 
 
Table 5 – UK spending on flood defence and security 
Disaster type Disasters in 2000-2007 Total losses (£billion) Budget allocated  (£billion) Total # Affected people 
Political conflict 
(terrorism) 25 1,011 No available data 
1 (2001) 
2.5 (2007/8) 
3.5 (2010/11) 
Floods 14 395,000< 9.1< 0.6 (2007/8) 0.8 (2010/11) 
Source: www.darmouth.edu, EM-DAT and (Senpinar-Brunner et al., 2009) 
 
6. Opportunities associated with effective use of resources 
6.1 Professional and official committees 
In the UK, detailed planning of emergency is conducted locally not only because of the complexity and 
difficulty to develop a single national plan that covers all emergencies, but also because “the most effective 
way is the local, as it shows the detail of problems and solutions adopted” [interviewee]. Multiple agency 
teams are setup to develop the relevant plans; they meet and exercise frequently which often lead to 
improving members’ skills and knowledge and when they move “the knowledge is lost!” Every time a 
committee is set up, it goes through the same difficulties which waste much time and effort. Committees 
need to record their experience in a systematic way, in order to ensure that the experience they went 
through is available to others, and that time and resources are used more effectively and efficiently. 
 
Committees are also subject to gradual reduction of resources, an interviewee stated that: “you got your 
resource then you think ‘well, we can take 10% out of that’ so in a quarter you lose 10% and in another 
quarter you lose 10%...and by the end of the year half of the people you used to have are lost. After 3 or 4 
years, the people (from organisations committed e.g. county councils, city council, ambulance service, 
police service and fire brigade) who used to go to those meetings are told: “don’t go!” because they are 
needed elsewhere”. The situation gets even more complicated with the adoption of ‘prioritisation’ as it is 
driven by not only the need, but also the political agenda. Prioritisation is an important process as it assists 
organisations to identify the most critical issues, and to allocate limited resources; however, any misuse 
could lead to less effective decisions. An interviewee stated that the way organisations are funded is what 
influences their priorities: “Let’s take the 4 hour wait time, which is an absolute and let’s consider 
planning for swine flu. You look at that, ‘we have to preserve our 4 hour wait time’ so that will create a set 
of admission processes. It is a 4hour wait so we have to get these people away within 4 hours. The next 
government comes along saying: ‘actually we are not interested in how long are waiting, we are interested 
in the outcomes!’ Your previous plan is expensive, and now you are dealing with the problem that you 
already have so then you change your plan because now what is going to be looked is how fast these 
people get better, not only the swine flu patients but also the A&E patients, which mean you will get a 
whole set of prioritisations” [interviewee]. In conclusion, emergency planning needs to be independent 
from agendas and strategies that could compromise the resilience of such critical service. 
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6.2 Independent investigations 
Over the last two decades the UK has experienced many extreme weather events which caused major 
disruption. However, most of these events often were only presented as ‘news’ due to the reluctance of 
scientists to investigate in detail the cause, and link them to the changing climate. They argue that it is 
impossible to establish an accurate link more than a generic expectations (Connor, 2011). This is true in a 
sense, however, information distilled from disaster stricken areas investigations reports, i.e. reconnaissance 
reports, could provide more detail for the emergency planning process. These reports are often conducted 
by independent experts (e.g. academics and engineers) in relevant fields where they identify strengths and 
vulnerabilities faced during extreme events; however, this practice needs yet to be adopted. When a big 
incident takes place, enquiries follow that tend to be headed by “trusted figures, such as Sir Michael Pitt 
who did the research on 2007 floods” [interviewee] and reports are published with a set of 
recommendations. Although these ‘trusted figures’ could be people from academia, there are different 
opinions on the involvement of academia in conducting investigations and developing relevant reports. 
Whilst some see it as “suspicious” and avoid sharing information others see it as a source of knowledge 
and information and time saving; an interviewee stated: “we would love to have the time doing the 
benchmarking of the practices and going to other businesses to see what everybody else is doing, to be able 
to read research and actually think that marries across is very useful”. Academic independent 
investigations provide a good approach to monitor the processes and measures taken to reduce the impact 
of hazards; and often develop a set of recommendations that will support the process of emergency 
planning. However, the fear of information being “twisted by media” in order to “create news” that could 
“give a person real hard time” [interviewee] will: cause more reluctance; halt many academic independent 
investigations to be conducted; and potentially limit academic curiosity, which viewed as one of the main 
routes for breakthroughs (Zewail, 2010). 
 
6.3 Priorities for emergency services 
The workshop participants’ discussion led to identify two levels of priorities: short and long terms 
summarised in Table 6. Resilience (risk assessment, prediction and mitigation) has been viewed as an 
essential and pressing issue that needs to be addressed urgently. Historic situations, lessons learnt, and 
good practice were suggested to be a start for the assessment of risks and identification of vulnerabilities. 
Recommendations were made to use IT tools to test and simulate the operation of emergency services and 
the potential integration with non-emergency services to pool and better manage resources. Amongst 
resources, staff number, morale, and safety were seen as urgent issues to be addressed as well. Staff 
members need to have the required competence (skills, knowledge and experience) to deal with 
emergencies (e.g. understanding surge, exercising plans, potential reconfigurations and roles). This will 
increase effectiveness and maintain public confidence, whose concern includes lifesaving, safety, 
continuity of services and quality assurance, specifically in the potential healthcare system reconfiguration. 
Adaptation to reconfiguration, through improved integration and partnership, was also viewed as an urgent 
priority. This should meet the requirements of the CCA 2004 and statutory designated by relevant 
authorities, managing and planning for extra efficiency while providing excellent service. 
 
Long-term priorities include the improvement of strategies and practice through modernisation initiatives 
and comprehensive review of resources (e.g. staff, vehicles, modern equipment, and supplies) and further 
engagement programmes with other key organisations in a unification or strategic partnership between 
Army, Police and Fire in particular. This could be through having “organisations and systems in place to 
anticipate future planning needs that can be affected by a variety of goal and national factors, needs and 
influences; for example, a national NHS emergency planning think-tank that bridges the gap between 
national planners and what works on the ground” [workshop participant]. This will need to be enhanced 
further through policies to support planning, preparedness, mitigation, response and reconstruction and will 
be facilitated through the development of IT services for real-time and online emergency services. This will 
require investigating and improving the resilience of infrastructure and support of academia and 
consequently will lead to efficiency in addition to innovative ways of emergency planning. 
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Table 6- Short- and long-term emergency priorities 
Short-term emergency priorities         Long-term emergency priorities 
• Assessment, prediction and mitigation 
• Human resources (including awareness and 
development of staff) 
• Improve public confidence 
• Improve management and communication processes 
• Improve partnership to integrate emergency and non-
emergency services and the local community 
• Improve strategies, policies and practices 
• Improve regional planning, collaboration and partnership 
• Develop IT services for real time and online emergency 
services 
• Improve resilience of the physical emergency infrastructure 
• Integration with academic and scientific support 
 
 
7. Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
 
7.1 Discussion 
The investigation establishes that there are many planning and financial challenges that have the potential 
to reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the healthcare emergency responses. Conversely, there are 
many opportunities that could provide extra support to the planning and response processes if they are well 
integrated within the processes. Planning for emergency responses depends on a good understanding of the 
components of the risk: hazard, exposure, location and vulnerability. The absence of accurate techniques to 
evaluate risks; the lack of sufficiently accurate risk information; and the predominance of security risks on 
the current strategies risk overlook naturally driven hazards in emergency planning. More scientific 
evidence is needed to inform emergency planners not only on the potential risks, but also on the scenarios 
and the potential impact these could have on infrastructure and society. As for understanding vulnerability, 
there is a need to develop a clear vision and process to collect and record information for monitoring 
performance of emergency services and critical infrastructure. This would require agreement between all 
parties on the type of information that is needed and its format for an easy access when needed. 
Independent investigators (e.g. academics) and official committees are amongst the resources that need to 
be ‘utilised’ more in emergency planning. These will provide not only evidence/scientific support about the 
hazard and vulnerability, but also play a major role in identifying priorities, developing more robust 
emergency plans, while taking into account of the current financial climate through the use of modern 
techniques (e.g. IT systems), and increasing knowledge and awareness of professionals. 
 
The findings of this research complement previous research work which focused on studying the resilience 
of healthcare from different perspectives such as: resilience strategies (Achour et al., 2008, Achour et al., 
2009, Achour and Price, 2010), structural and non-structural behaviour (Achour et al., 2011), utility 
supplies and impact on hospital operation (Achour et al., 2014), and design and space planning (Pascale et 
al., 2014). It explores ways to improve social resilience of healthcare and emphasises the need for 
developing a holistic view of resilience integrating the physical and social aspects of resilience. The 
implications and impact of this research are recognised in the revised versions of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) Hospital Safety Index (HSI) and the UK Health Building Note (HBN) 00-07,where 
authors collaborated with responsible institutions to address on critical issues, including the connection 
between the healthcare facility and infrastructure; proximity to source of hazard; risk identification; risk 
reduction systems; and integration of the social and physical aspects of resilience. The major contribution 
of this work is the fact that the research team has been successful in providing a comprehensive set of 
information to benefit policy makers to take decisions when improving the resilience of healthcare, as have 
been documented in the HSI and HBN 00-07. Future research plan will be grounded on this work with a 
view to study the resilience of a regional and local healthcare system. 
 
7.2 Conclusions and recommendations 
Within the last decade, the UK has made a significant progress toward developing a comprehensive 
strategy and plans to respond to major emergencies and thus increasing its resilience to cope with modern 
risks. However, recent extreme weather events demonstrated that this progress needs more refinement in 
order to achieve a higher level of resilience. This research has investigated arrangements made for 
healthcare emergency response with the aim to support emergency planners and responders to develop a 
more effective and efficient emergency model. 
 
The main conclusion of this research is that healthcare emergency planning in the UK should be developed 
based on the holistic approach that considers the complexity of the inter-connected organisations that form 
the whole system. Strong leadership from the central government is required to allocate resources to this 
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highly important area, and use them more effectively, especially with recent extreme floods which have 
inundated part of the UK in winter 2013/14. This leadership will encourage multi-agency collaboration to 
establish partnerships, joining-up policies and operational emergency plans. Certainly, this will not happen 
overnight, but will require nurturing and progressive steps over longer time. This endeavour has the 
potential to lead to a more resilient, effective and efficient healthcare emergency system. Based on the 
finding of the research, it is suggested that the emergency planning process therefore needs to: 
1. identify and evaluate risks more accurately; 
2. enhance opportunities and reduce risks associated with multi-agency approaches (e.g. good 
communication, and better integration); 
3. ensure that soft and hard resources (e.g. processes, staff and infrastructure) are well integrated 
in the planning; 
4. involve and integrate more with independent parties such as academia for extra support; and 
5. innovatively use IT systems to develop a comprehensive emergency model, predict 
vulnerabilities and optimise effectiveness and efficiency. 
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